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ABSTRACT 
The emerging cloud computing technology enables new essential scenarios in healthcare, in particular those of data sharing 
among practitioners. Nevertheless, their security and privacy concerns still impede the wide adoption of cloud computing in 
this area. Although there are numerous publications in the context of cloud computing in healthcare, we found no consistent 
typical security and privacy system requirements framework in this domain so far. Owing to the lack of those studies and 
preparing the ground for creating secure and privacy-friendly cloud architectures for healthcare, we survey security and 
privacy system requirements for cloud-based medical data sharing scenarios using two strategies. We base on a systematic 
design science approach following the literature-driven requirement elicitation strategy and apply an established security 
requirement elicitation methodology as part of the scenario-driven strategy. Finally, we evaluate and compare the two 
security and privacy system requirements elicitation strategies used in this paper.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There are multiple new scenarios enabled through the adoption of the emerging cloud computing technology in healthcare 
(Loehr et al., 2010), whereas the data sharing scenarios are of high relevance to practitioners (He et al., 2010; Kanagaraj and 
Sumathi, 2011; Huang et al., 2011; Zhang and Lu, 2010). Nevertheless, cloud computing also faces many security and 
privacy challenges (Deng et al., 2011; Ekonomou et al., 2011), which raise wide concerns among patients and medical 
workers (Li et al., 2011b, Li et al., 2012, Chen et al., 2012a; Deng et al., 2012; Shini et al., 2012; Abbadi et al., 2011), in 
particular the risk of losing control over data (Chen and Hoang, 2011, Li et al., 2010). Many researchers observe a research 
potential with respect to the existing security and privacy preserving mechanisms (Loehr et al., 2010; Abbadi et al., 2011; 
Deng et al., 2011; Shini et al., 2012), while Ekonomou et al. (2011) call for establishing human trust campaigns. 
Although there are numerous publications in the domain of cloud computing in healthcare, to our knowledge there are few 
works about general and systematic security and privacy system requirements frameworks so far (Zhang and Liu, 2010; Deng 
et al., 2011) and none that are elicited by multilateral requirements engineering methods, which would be able to also point 
out potential conflicts between the requirements. With this background we aim to take first steps to close this research gap.  
The present work is aimed to support the TRESOR (TRusted Ecosystem for Standardized and Open cloud-based Resources) 
research project with healthcare practitioners (TRESOR, 2013) funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology. To elicit security and privacy system requirements, we follow literature-driven and scenario-driven strategies. 
The implication of the first strategy is conducted in accordance with the design science framework proposed by Hevner et al. 
(2004). Based on the literature search framework introduced by vom Brocke et al. (2009), we systematically review articles 
published up to year 2012 dealing with security and privacy preserving mechanisms for the use of cloud computing in 
healthcare, then define system security and privacy requirements, and evaluate them in semi-structured interviews with 
different experts from the German healthcare industry. We use the requirement pattern presented by Rupp (2005, in German) 
to formulate the requirements. The second strategy covers security and privacy system requirements arising from specific 
processes and multiple stakeholders with different interests in healthcare data sharing scenarios and relies on an established 
security requirements elicitation methodology called Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis (MSRA) (Fabian et al., 
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2010; Gürses et al., 2005; Gürses and Santen, 2006; Gürses et al., 2006; Gürses, 2010). Finally, we provide a comparison of 
the two security and privacy elicitation strategies and further research options in this field. 
The paper is organized as follows. The background and work related to the topic is provided in section 2. We introduce our 
research design in section 3 and present the results in the fourth section. In conclusion, we summarize all findings and present 
our further research directions.  
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
The relatively new technology of cloud computing creates a scenario diversity in healthcare (Loehr et al., 2010), one of them 
the medical data sharing scenarios remarked by He et al. (2010), Kanagaraj and Sumathi (2011), Huang et al. (2011), and 
Zhang and Lu (2010) as being of particularly high relevance to practitioners. The wide adoption of cloud computing in 
healthcare is, however, impeded by many still open security and privacy challenges (Deng et al., 2011; Ekonomou et al., 
2011). Li et al. (2011b), Li et al. (2012), Chen et al. (2012a), Deng et al. (2012), Shini et al. (2012). Abbadi et al. (2011) 
speak about concerns among patients and medical workers, which Chen and Hoang (2011) and Li et al. (2010) in particular 
relate to the risk of losing control over data. Loehr et al. (2010), Abbadi et al. (2011), Deng et al. (2011), and Shini et al. 
(2012) call for further research on the existing security and privacy preserving mechanisms, while Ekonomou et al. (2011) 
propose undertaking campaigns for establishing human trust. 
An unsystematic analysis of some related security and privacy threats for medical data sharing scenarios in the cloud 
computing environment is provided by Nematzadeh and Camp (2010), Shini et al. (2012), and Loehr et al. (2010). There are 
also some authors who introduce security and privacy-enhancing mechanisms, however without a careful analysis of 
multilateral security and privacy requirements. Those works elaborate on access control (Basu et al., 2012; Chen and Hoang, 
2011; Chen et al., 2012a; Chen et al., 2012b; Li et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012; Yu et al. 2010), keyword search over encrypted 
records (Li et al., 2011b), unlinkability between the patient and the electronic health record (Li et al., 2011a), and tracing of 
traitors (Nematzadeh and Camp, 2010). Attempts to elicit security and privacy system requirements with respect to medical 
data sharing in the cloud were undertaken by Zhang and Liu (2010) and Deng et al. (2011). Deng et al. (2011) relied on the 
business logic and the architecture of a home healthcare system in the cloud, particularly aimed to support depressed patients. 
The review of related literature thus shows there is no security and privacy system requirements framework elicited by 
established security requirement elicitation approaches (Gürses et al., 2005; Gürses and Santen, 2006; Gürses et al., 2006; 
Gürses, 2010; Fabian et al., 2010), in particular the multilateral ones, which would be able to also point out potential conflicts 
between requirements.  
RESEARCH DESIGN  
In our research, we apply literature-driven and scenario-driven strategies to elicit security and privacy requirements. 
While applying the first one, we follow the design science framework proposed by Hevner et al. (2004) and elicit system 
requirements in three cycles, namely rigor cycle, design cycle, relevance cycle. In the rigor cycle, we conduct a systematic 
literature search on security and privacy friendly mechanisms for the use of cloud computing in healthcare in accordance with 
the literature search framework proposed by vom Brocke et al. (2009). We base on the AIS ranking list and search in the 
EBSCOhost, IEEE Xplore, Emerald, ScienceDirect, AISeL, Springer, ACM Digital Library and Proquest literature databases, 
and apply a combined backward and forward search. Then we evaluate the findings of the literature analysis and define the 
initial draft in the design cycle. In the final relevance cycle we conduct semi-structured interviews with different experts from 
the German healthcare industry to evaluate the developed requirements. We formulate the requirements in accordance with 
the framework presented by Rupp (2005, in German). 
To define scenario-driven, multilateral security and privacy requirements, we follow the multilateral security requirements 
analysis (MSRA) method (Gürses et al., 2005; Gürses and Santen, 2006; Gürses et al., 2006; Gürses, 2010; Fabian et al., 
2010). According to Fabian et al. (2010), the paradigm of multilateral security contradicts the traditional view by 
acknowledging stakeholders’ conflicting interests with respect to assets. This is essential in healthcare delivery involving 
multiple parties. Based on the main functionalities of a data sharing scenario enabled through cloud computing, we identify 
stakeholders, i.e., parties concerned to the system-to-be, and elaborate on their security and privacy goals. In all the steps, we 
rely on the expert interviews and the literature analysis. In our further research we are going to identify facts and assumptions 
as the relevant properties of the environment and refine stakeholder views on the scenario taking them into account, reconcile 
the identified security and privacy goals by capturing conflicts between them, finding compromises between conflicting 
goals, and establishing a consistent set of security and privacy system requirements. Finally, we will reconcile them and 
functional requirements in a real project. 
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RESULTS 
Literature-driven system security and privacy requirements collection 
Zhang and Liu (2010) refer to traditional security goals (e.g., Fabian et al., 2010) confidentiality, integrity and availability 
extended by authentication, non-repudiation, and audit and archiving, as well as ownership of information, patent consent and 
authorization. These are referred to and used by Chen et al. (2012b) and further extended by Deng et al. (2011).  
 
Type Concept / Security 
or Privacy Goal 
Source Requirement 
Security Users’ Authenticity 
and Authentication 
Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Chen et al. (2012a), 
Chen et al. (2012b) 
The system shall verify the identities of users at 
the entry of every access (Zhang and Liu, 2010). 
 
Security Non-Repudiation of 
Users’ Actions 
Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Chen et al. (2012a), 
Chen et al. (2012b) 
The system shall ensure that one party of a 
transaction cannot deny having received a 
transaction nor can the other party deny having 
sent a transaction (Zhang and Liu, 2010). 
Security Non-Repudiation of 
Users’ Emergency 
Access 
Loehr et al. (2010) The system shall ensure that one cannot deny 
having had an emergency access. 
Security Auditability of 
Users’ Actions 
Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Chen and Hoang 
(2011), Deng et al. 
(2011), Basu et al. 
(2012), Chen et al. 
(2012b) 
The system shall record user actions (e.g., in a 
chronological order by maintaining a log of every 
access to and modification of data) (Zhang and 
Liu, 2010).  
 




Loehr et al. (2010), 
Basu et al. (2012) 
The system shall enable data sharing and access 
without the patient’s involvement. 
Privacy Users’ Anonymity Loehr et al. (2010), 
Nematzadeh and Camp 
(2010), Li et al. 
(2011b) 
The system shall prevent determining the user’s 
identity based on her actions and/or indexes (Li et 
al. 2011b). 
Privacy Confidentiality of 
Users’ Access 
Privileges 
Chen and Hoang 
(2011), Yu et al. (2010) 
The system shall ensure access privileges 
information is accessible only to the authorized 
users. 
Table 1. User-Related System Security and Privacy Requirements Collection through a Literature Analysis 
The special properties addressed by the authors of security and privacy friendly mechanisms for the use of cloud computing 
in healthcare data sharing scenarios are formulated as fine-grained access control (Li et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2010; Chen and 
Hoang, 2011; Li et al., 2011b; Basu et al., 2012; Li et al., 2012), access right revocation (Li et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011b; Li et 
al., 2012; Basu et al., 2012), flexible data access policies (especially under emergency scenarios) or emergency exceptions 
(Li et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011a; Li et al., 2012), efficiency, scalability, and usability (e.g., user secret key accountability) of 
the proposed mechanisms (Li et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011b; Basu et al., 2012; Li et al., 2012), write access 
control (Li et al., 2012), record anonymity (Li et al., 2011a), index and query privacy (Li et al., 2011b), and user access 
privilege confidentiality (Yu et al., 2010). Further related concepts include prevention of security attacks and violations 
(Nematzadeh and Camp, 2010; Chen et al., 2012b; Shini et al., 2012), data sharing and access without the patient’s 
involvement (Loehr et al., 2010; Basu et al., 2012), secure record’s navigation (Basu et al., 2012), confidentiality of a 
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medical record’s existence for a given person (Loehr et al., 2010), client anonymity (Loehr et al., 2010; Nematzadeh and 
Camp, 2010), and non-repudiation of emergency access (Loehr et al., 2010).  
 
Type Concept / Security 
or Privacy Goal 
Source Requirement 
Security Ownership of 
Medical Record 
Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Chen et al. (2012b), 
Shini et al. (2012) 
The system shall define the creator, author and 
manager of the data (Zhang and Liu, 2010). 
Security Confidentiality of 
Medical Record 
Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Yu et al. (2010), Chen 
and Hoang (2011), 
Deng et al. (2011), Li 
et al. (2011a), Basu et 
al. (2012), Chen et al. 
(2012b), Li et al. 
(2012), Shini et al. 
(2012) 
The system shall ensure the data is accessible only 
to the authorized readers (Zhang and Liu). 
The system shall ensure the data is accessible only 
to the unauthorized contributors (Li et al., 2012). 
Security Integrity of Medical 
Record 
Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Chen and Hoang 
(2011), Deng et al. 
(2011), Li et al. 
(2011a), Chen et al. 
(2012a), Chen et al. 
(2012b), Shini et al. 
(2012) 
The system shall preserve the accuracy and 
consistency of data (Zhang and Liu, 2010). 
Security Availability and 
Utility of Medical 
Record 
Deng et al. (2011), 
Basu et al. (2012), 
Shini et al. (2012) 
The system shall ensure the availability and utility 
of data when needed. 
Security Archiving of 
Medical Record 
Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Chen et al. (2012b) 
The system shall restore data without a loss when 
needed (Zhang and Liu, 2010). 




Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Deng et al. (2011), 
Chen et al. (2012b), 
Basu et al. (2012) 
The system shall allow the patient to grant rights 
over her or his data to other users (Zhang and Liu, 
2010). 
Security Fine-Grained 
Access to Medical 
Record 
Li et al. (2010), Yu et 
al. (2010), Chen and 
Hoang (2011), Deng et 
al. (2011), Li et al. 
(2011b), Basu et al. 
(2012), Li et al. (2012) 
The system shall ensure different users are 
authorized to read and write different sets of data 
(Li et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012; Li et al., 2011b). 
Security Revocation of 
Access to Medical 
Record 
Li et al. (2010), Li et 
al. (2011b), Basu et al. 
(2012), Li et al. (2012) 
The system shall prevent the user from future 
access when necessary (Li et al., 2010; Li et al., 
2012; Li et al., 2011b). 
The system shall prevent the user from access to 
future data when necessary (Li et al., 2012). 
Table 2. Medical Record-Related System Security and Privacy Requirements Collection through a Literature Analysis 
Based on these observations, we derive three system security and privacy requirements collection sets, namely those directly 
related to users, i.e., medical workers, the flow and storage of medical records and the system itself, which we respectively 
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present in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3. An initial observation already reveals some conflicts between the security and 
privacy goals specified, e.g., patent consent and authorization to medical record sharing and users’ sharing and access without 
the patient’s involvement, auditability of users’ actions and users’ anonymity, as well as confidentiality of medical records 
and emergency exception. This supports the necessity of a multilateral security paradigm. 
 
Type Concept / Security 
or Privacy Goal 
Source Requirement 
Security Flexible or/and 
Emergency Access 
to Medical Record 
Li et al. (2010), 
Nematzadeh and Camp 
(2010), Deng et al. 
(2011), Li et al. 
(2011a), Li et al. 
(2012) 
The system shall allow changes to the data access 





Li et al. (2011a) The system shall ensure the unlinkability between 




Deng et al. (2011) The system shall prevent determining the patient’s 
or/and owner’s identity based on the document (Li 
et al., 2011a). 
Privacy Confidentiality of 
Medical Record’s 
Existence 
Loehr et al. (2010), 
Basu et al. (2012) 
The system shall ensure information about a 
document’s existence for a given patient is 
accessible only to the authorized users (Loehr et 
al., 2010). 
Table 2. (cont.) Data-Related System Security and Privacy Requirements Collection through a Literature Analysis 
 
Type Concept / Security 
or Privacy Goal 
Source Requirement 
Security Availability and 
Utility of System 
Zhang and Liu (2010), 
Deng et al. (2011), 
Chen et al. (2012b) 
The system shall serve its purpose and be 
available when needed (Zhang and Liu, 2010). 
Security Efficiency, 
Scalability and 
Usability of System 
Li et al. (2010), Yu et 
al. (2010), Deng et al. 
(2011), Li et al. 
(2011b), Basu et al. 
(2012), Li et al. (2012) 
The system shall be efficient, scalable and usable. 
The system shall support a large and unpredictable 
number of users (Li et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012; Li 
et al. 2011b). 
Security Detection and 
Prevention of 
Security Attacks 
and Violations in 
System 
Nematzadeh and Camp 
(2010), Chen and 
Hoang (2011), Chen et 
al. (2012b), Shini et al. 
(2012) 
The system shall detect and prevent any security 
attacks and violations (e.g., illegal behavior over 
data) (Chen and Hoang, 2011), e.g. by sending an 
alert when malicious action is in progress. 
Table 3. System-Related System Security and Privacy Requirements Collection through a Literature Analysis 
Scenario driven security and privacy requirements elicitation 
Following the MSRA framework provided by TAPAS (2004), Gürses et al. (2005), and Fabian et al. (2010) and based on the 
preliminary literature analysis and expert interviews, we identify direct stakeholders whose information is being exchanged 
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and indirect stakeholders only interested in the system-to-be. The information exchanged is then specified in an information 
model.  
In the taxonomy of direct stakeholders’ roles, we differentiate between the roles of Patient and Clinician who may be a doctor 
(e.g., intern, senior physician, chief physician, and consultant physician) or a nurse (e.g., nurse, senior nurse, and medical 
registration). Among indirect stakeholders, we distinguish between a Health Care Cloud (HCC), some independent 
researcher, the government, Healthcare Certification Authority (HCA), National Health Insurance (NHI) (TAPAS, 2004; Li 
et al., 2011a) and a non-clinician in a healthcare organization who may perform QA (Quality Assurance) management, 
administration (e.g., administrative employee, administrative registration, research employee, controlling, data protection 






Requirement Derived from a Literature Analysis 
Clinician Confidentiality of Medical Record 
Integrity of Medical Record 
Fine-Grained Access to Medical Record 
Revocation of Access to Medical Record 
Flexible or/and Emergency Access to Medical Record 
Patient Consent and Authorization to Medical Data 
Sharing 
Medical Records 
Non-Clinician Confidentiality of Medical Record’s Existence 
Unlinkability between Patients and Medical Records 
Identification Data Non-Clinician Patients’ Anonymity in Medical Record 
Patient 
Patients’ Data 







Outside Users’ Anonymity 
Access Privileges  Outside Confidentiality of Users’ Access Privileges 
 
Decisions 





Local Content Outside  
Table 3. System Security and Privacy Requirements Collection through a Scenario Analysis 
A scenario where information sharing between clinicians with respect to a patient takes place can be described as follows. 
After completion of treatment, the patient is discharged from the hospital and goes to another hospital or rehabilitation 
facility. Her doctor sends medical records containing the patients’ medical history, diagnosis, medications, allergies etc., 
whereas the nurse provides other information, e.g., the patient’s having an infectious germ. The communication is enabled 
via cloud. Similar information sharing scenarios are considered in the works by He et al. (2010), Kanagaraj and Sumathi 
(2011), Huang et al. (2011), Zhang and Lu (2010). 
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For our main two direct stakeholders’ roles, we formulate corresponding information models. The information being shared 
about a Patient includes: 
• medical records; 
• patients’ identification data (possibly) contained in medical records; 
• patients’ data (possibly) to be revealed from clinicians’ actions and/or indexes. 
The information model of a Clinician constitutes: 
• clinicians’ actions (e.g., data transmission or/and reception) and identification data audited for non-repudiation 
purposes;  
• clinicians’ access privileges;  
• clinicians’ decisions (possibly) to be revealed from medical records;  
• local content in case of using local-based services. 
Potential security threats may arise from both inside and outside counter-stakeholders driven by curiosity, the expectation of 
profit making, etc. (TAPAS, 2004; Deng et al., 2011). The potential counter-stakeholders can be other patients, medical 
personal not involved in the treatment, colleagues of the patient, insurance companies, the public, etc.  
In Table 3, we define some requirements suggestions describing which counter-stakeholder’s actions should be restricted in 
respect to which information object of which stakeholder and compare them to the previously derived ones. The possible 
actions here may include sharing, reading, modifying, and deleting. The table shows, the requirement sets derived through a 
literature and scenario analysis have many requirements in common as well as contain some unique ones. 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK 
The wide adoption of the new cloud computing paradigm facilitating new essential scenarios in healthcare is mainly 
restricted by security and privacy challenges and concerns.  
In the present work, we derived a set of security and privacy system requirements for adopting cloud computing in healthcare 
data sharing scenarios based on a design science approach in the literature-driven strategy and the multilateral security 
requirements analysis methodology in the scenario-driven strategy.  
Both requirements elicitation strategies gave many common results, but also helped to capture some unique requirements, 
thus supplementing each other. The common requirements are related to the medical records and identification data of 
patients, as well as the actions, identification data, and access privileges of clinicians in the system. The scenario analysis 
also revealed patients’ data (possibly) to be revealed from clinicians’ actions and/or indexes, decisions (possibly) to be 
revealed from medical records, and local content in case of using local-based services as protection targets. The literature 
analysis additionally pointed out users’ authenticity and authentication; auditability, non-repudiation of users’ emergency and 
non-emergency actions; users’ actions with and without patient’s involvement; as well as system’s availability and utility, 
efficiency, scalability and usability, and detection and prevention of security attacks and violations there. Thus, the 
comparison shows, the scenario-driven strategy provides much more detailed results, whereas the literature-driven strategy 
gives a more comprehensive varied requirements set, here possibly due to mature state of research in this field.  
The observation of the results of the adoption of the literature-derived strategy revealed some conflicts between the security 
and privacy goals specified, e.g., patent consent and authorization to medical record sharing and user’s sharing and access 
without the patient’s involvement, auditability of users’ actions and users’ anonymity, as well as confidentiality of medical 
records and emergency exception. Through the application of the principles of the established MSRA method in the 
information sharing scenario, we identified the concerned parties and their security and privacy information assets to be 
protected. Our future work here will be aimed at identifying facts and assumptions and refining stakeholder views, capturing 
conflicts between security and privacy goals and searching compromises between them to make the security and privacy 
requirements set consistent.  
The concluding research goal we see is a more detailed evaluation and comparison of the two security and privacy elicitation 
techniques used in this paper, namely the literature research focusing on system security and privacy system requirements 
within a design science framework, and an established multilateral security requirements method that is able to refine the 
former approach and to point out (and hopefully solve) potential requirements interactions or conflicts in an early system 
development phase.  
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